In developing countries and in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, social protection schemes tend to operate in silos. However, schemes targeting the same geographical areas may have synergies that have not yet been examined. This paper contributes to this knowledge gap by examining the joint impacts of two social protection programmes in Ethiopia, that is, the Productive Safety Net Program and a Community Based Health Insurance Scheme. Based on three rounds of individuallevel panel data and several rounds of qualitative interviews, we find that individuals covered by both programs, as opposed to neither or only one of the two programs, provide greater labor supply, have larger livestock holdings and have a lower amount of outstanding loans. Furthermore, joint participation is associated with greater use of modern health care facilities. These results show that bundling of interventions enhances protection against multiple risks and that linking social protection schemes yields more than the sum of their individual effects.
Introduction
As in other developing countries, rural Ethiopian households are exposed to a variety of natural, economic and health risks (Yilma et al., 2014) . Continued dependence on rain-fed agriculture as the main livelihood source (Di Falco et al., 2011; Tilahun et al., 2011) coupled with the lack of well-developed credit and insurance markets, intensifies the effects of these risks. For instance, in the absence of health insurance, exposure to a health shock may lead to borrowing and selling of assets and reinforce existing poverty and in turn, harm the ability of households to cope with nonhealth related risks. The potential interplay and mutually reinforcing negative effects of different types of shocks suggests that effective protection may require the simultaneous implementation of multiple social protection interventions.
There is a large literature that has examined the effect of specific social protection instruments. For instance, in the context of low and middle income countries a number of papers have demonstrated the effect of cash transfer programs on food consumption, health and educational outcomes (Hidrobo et al., 2018; Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005; Burchi et al., 2016; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Gertler, 2004) , the effect of public works programs on asset-building, climatic risks and food security (Hidrobo et al., 2018; Anderson et al., 2011; Gilligan et al., 2009; Subbarao, 1997; Ravallion, 1991) and the effect of health insurance schemes on health care utilization and financial protection on the one hand (Strupat and Klohn, 2018; Limwatthananon et al., 2015; Mebratie et al., 2013; Escobar et al., 2010; Pagán et al., 2007; Wagstaff and Pradhan, 2005 ) and on borrowing and assets sales on the other .
Despite this large body of work, studies, which have examined the inter-linkages and the joint effects of participating in different social protection programs on welfare outcomes, are scarce. In contrast, there is a comparatively well-developed literature, which has examined the interlinkages between agricultural interventions and social protection programs, although papers on Africa even in this literature are limited.
1 For instance, Pace et al. (2017) use difference-indifference (DiD) with propensity score matching to analyze the joint effect of Malawi's Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) and Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP), which target poor and ultrapoor households, on household expenditure and production. Despite the lack of explicit coordination between the two programs, the authors find that the joint effect of participating in both programs increases total expenditure per adult equivalent by 24% as compared to the baseline mean for households who participate in both the programs and the value of production increases by at least 70% of the baseline mean. Daidone et al. (2017) also use a DiD approach to examine the joint effect of a homestead gardening program which targeted households who were eligible for a child grants program. They conclude that the positive effects of the programs on productive agricultural activities may be attributed to the joint effect of the two schemes. Turning to Ethiopia, in an evaluation that relied on propensity score matching, Gilligan et al. (2009) 
examined the joint effects of the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and an agricultural intervention -Other
Food Security Program (OFSP), and found that, among other effects, access to both programs enhanced food security and increased the use of agricultural technologies. However, access to both programs did not lead to faster asset growth as compared to households that did not have access to either of the programs. In a related paper, Hoddinott et al. (2012) used a dose-response model to investigate the joint effect of being a beneficiary of both the PSNP and the OFSP as compared to participation only in the PSNP. They find that participation in both programs tends to enhance agricultural investments.
Closest to the theme of this paper which deals with the joint effects of social protection programs, Jensen et al. (2017) examine the comparative individual effects as well as explore the 1 Soares et al. (2016) provide a 37-study review of the combined effects of agricultural and social protection interventions. Of the studies included in their review, nine are from Africa of which four focus on Ethiopia. Agricultural interventions include programs that provide for instance, improved seeds, fertilizer and credit subsidies, extension services, and livestock transfers. Social protection programs include cash transfers, health and nutrition interventions, insurance schemes, public works programs.
joint impacts of a cash transfer program and a livestock insurance scheme in Northern Kenya.
They find no evidence of positive synergies and attribute this to the minor overlap in coverage between the two programs. In the Ethiopian context, Berhane et al. (2014) examine the effect of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and the community-based nutrition (CBN) program in localities where both schemes are operating. Their investigation reveals that there are no joint effects on various indicators of child nutrition. However, they also point out that the two schemes are "loosely meshed" and are co-located but not linked programmatically. While our paper also focuses on Ethiopia, there are differences in terms of the scheme interactions that we explore and the context.
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Motivated by the findings that PSNP participants are substantially more likely to enrol in a Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme (Shigute et al. 2017) and by the limited research on the impacts of multiple social interventions, this paper examines the interplay between the CBHI and PSNP. In particular, the paper investigates whether participating in both the CBHI and the PSNP provides additional protection to households as compared to participating in only one of the schemes or as compared to not participating in either of the schemes. Consistent with the motivation for launching the CBHI and PSNP, we focus on the effects of the schemes on modern health care utilization, off-farm labor supply, livestock assets, loan uptake and the value of outstanding loans.
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The paper relies on three rounds of individual panel data. The first edition of the individual data was collected in 2011, that is, before the launch of the CBHI and subsequent rounds were collected in 2012 and 2013. We also draw on qualitative information collected through key 2 A related body of literature examines the bundling of health insurance with microfinance loans (Banerjee et al., 2014; Hamid et al., 2011; Ranson et al., 2006) . Evidence on the effectiveness of such an approach is mixed. For instance, Banerjee et al. (2014) find that the poor quality of the insurance product leads to negative effects and a withdrawal from the microfinance scheme. In contrast, Hamid et al. (2011) find that microcredit clients who had access to health insurance were more likely to be food sufficient as compared to microcredit clients who did not have access to the insurance product. 3 We focus on livestock assets as a measure of wealth as according to Dercon (2004) , "livestock is by far the most important marketable asset and typically is accounting for more than 90% of the value of assets in rural Ethiopia".
informant interview and focus group discussions conducted in 2012, 2014 and 2017. Our analysis of both sources of information yields a consistent picture.
We find that both programs complement each other and generate synergies. Individuals covered by both programs, as opposed to neither or only one of the two programs, provide more off-farm labor, have higher livestock wealth and have a lower amount of outstanding loans.
Furthermore, joint participation is associated with greater use of modern health care facilities.
Thus, our results indicate that the co-ordination of a public works and a health insurance scheme affords greater protection to vulnerable households.
The paper unfolds by providing in the next section a brief description of the two programs.
Section 3 discusses the data while section 4 outlines an analytical and an empirical framework.
Section 5 discusses the findings while section 6 contains concluding observations.
A brief overview of the PSNP and the CBHI

The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)
Before 2005, efforts to enhance food security and deal with natural disasters, chiefly drought, were based on providing emergency assistance (MoARD 2009a , MoARD 2005 . With the objective of relieving households from dependence on emergency assistance, the government in collaboration with donor agencies designed the PSNP. The PSNP attempts to shift the trend from meeting short term food needs to addressing the root causes of food insecurity by building durable community assets -mainly natural resource management projects designed to reduce soil erosion, control floods and harvest and conserve water (MoARD 2009b , MoARD 2010 .
The program focuses on food insecure households residing in food insecure areas.
Participation is not voluntary but is based on a combination of geographical and community-based targeting. At the first stage, government officials identify food-insecure districts based on previous food aid allocation data. Within districts, local administrators identify chronically food-insecure villages and allocate the PSNP resources within these villages. Household-level targeting is based on selecting households who have received emergency aid in the past and on other criteria such as assets (landholdings, livestock), income from non-agricultural activities and from alternative sources of employment. However, communities have the discretion to modify this approach and to annually update their lists of food-insecure households based on local conditions.
The program differentiates between two types of beneficiaries -direct support and public works -and offers support in cash or in kind to eligible households with no able-bodied members while public works beneficiaries receive payments based on their labor contributions to public works projects. 4 In the short run, the program expects to enhance food security by meeting the immediate needs of food insecure households and in the medium to longer run by preventing sales of productive assets and promoting sustainable livelihoods through the construction of rural infrastructure.
Unlike previous food security efforts, a key objective of the PSNP in its current design is to integrate existing and future development interventions. As stated in the Program Implementation Manual (MoARD, 2010: 6) , "The PSNP is not a project but a key element of local development planning." This approach has been re-emphasized in the most recent PSNP design document (MoA, 2014: 3) which aims to ensure that "poor and vulnerable households benefit from an essential suite of services including safety net transfers, livelihood interventions, key health and nutrition services, community assets constructed through public works and support to households up to, during and beyond safety net graduation to ensure that the improvements they have achieved are sustainable."
Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI)
Over the past decade, Ethiopia has invested heavily in its rural health infrastructure and recorded notable progress in a number of population health outcomes (see Mebratie et al., 2015) . For instance, child mortality per 1,000 live births has fallen from 166 in 2000 to 88 in 2011 and maternal mortality rates have declined from 871 to 676 per 100,000 live births Federal Ministry of Health, 2011) . Despite these improvements and investments in infrastructure, as is evident from the figures, challenges remain. For instance, overall utilization rates remain low.
According to the Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey, in 2011, annual per capita outpatient health care utilization was about 0.3 visits, that is, 3 visits for every 10 persons. This low utilization rate is accompanied by a high reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments to finance health care.
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In particular, Yilma et al. (2014) show that households finance health care, in decreasing order of importance, by dissaving, asset sales and borrowing.
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In response to this situation, in June 2011, in an attempt to enhance access to health care and help defray costs while at the same time prevent the use of harmful coping strategies (asset sales, borrowing), the government launched, a voluntary CBHI. The pilot scheme was launched in 13 districts, of which nine were classified as food insecure and were covered by the PSNP. There are no co-payments or deductibles (for additional details, see Mebratie et al. 2015) .
While the scheme is government-driven, there is a degree of community engagement in scheme management and supervision. At the design phase, regional governments were involved in determining benefit packages, registration fees, and premium payments. The rollout phase 5 FMoH (2010) estimates that local and international donors finance about 40% of health care, out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure accounts for about 37% and central and local governments cover about 21% of the expenditure. Employer and other private insurance schemes cover the remainder (about 2%).
involved a two-step process. First, the community decides whether to participate in the scheme and subsequently households choose whether to enrol or not. Based on our survey data, in 2013, almost 51 percent of individuals in the pilot districts had enrolled in the scheme.
Data
The paper is based on three rounds of panel data. The first round was collected in March-April 2011, that is, a few months before the launch of the CBHI while subsequent rounds were collected in March-April 2012 and March-April 2013. Data collection followed a stratified sampling design and the survey was fielded in sixteen districts located in four main regions of the country (Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and SNNPR). Within each district, six villages were randomly selected and within each village, 17 households were randomly surveyed, yielding a total sample of 1,632 households.
The follow-up survey in 2012 revisited 1,599 households and the 2013 edition covered 1,583 households (3% attrition). The analysis reported in the paper focuses on working-age adults (aged 15 to 65) and is based on an unbalanced panel of 12,820 observations.
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In each region, the survey covered three CBHI pilot districts and one non-pilot district.
The non-pilot districts were chosen based on the same criteria used to select the pilot districts. Of the sixteen districts, there are nine districts where both the CBHI and the PSNP operate, 3 where the CBHI operates but not the PSNP and 4 where the PSNP operates but the CBHI was not offered (see Table A1 ). The questionnaire included questions on PSNP and CBHI membership, modules on individual and household socio-economic characteristics and demographics, assets, employment, consumption expenditure, health and health care use, access to credit, social networks, and shocks.
We also collected three rounds of qualitative information through key informant interviews and FGDs. These were conducted in 2012, 2014 and in 2017. Among other topics, these interviews and discussions focused on factors that determine participation in the CBHI and the experience of officials and FGD participants with the two interventions.
4.
Analytical framework and empirical approach
Analytical Framework
Our objective is to examine whether participating in both the CBHI and the PSNP provides additional protection to households as compared to participating in only one of the schemes or as compared to not participating in either of the schemes. Potentially, the two schemes may have an effect on a variety of outcomes, and based on the main channels through which they are expected to operate, this section outlines and motivates the key outcomes that are the focus of this paper.
The main aim of the CBHI is to enhance access to health care use and to protect households against the costs of financing health care. As shown in Yilma et al. (2014) , in the absence of access to insurance, households meet their health expenses by reducing savings, borrowing and selling assets. Informal insurance arrangements and support from family and friends in the form of remittances are not a major source of support. Hence, it may be expected that insurance will work towards not only enhancing access to health care and reducing out-ofpocket payments for medical services but will also allow households to reduce their reliance on borrowing and avoid asset sales.
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The PSNP is expected to enhance food security by providing payments for labor contributions. It is also expected to prevent households from borrowing and resorting to asset sales during times of crises. Thus, simply due to the needs of the scheme, PSNP participants may be expected to provide more off-farm labor as compared to non-participants. Furthermore, these labor contributions are important not only from the perspective of households but also from the perspective of PSNP program managers, as labor is needed to construct public works. As discussed in Shigute et al. (2017) , participation in the PSNP has a strong effect on CBHI uptake. Despite the fact that the two schemes are not programmatically linked, the large effect of PSNP participation on CBHI uptake may be attributed to the keen sense of the links between the two programs as perceived by local officials.
For instance, based on the qualitative information gathered through the key informant interviews we found that government officials have been taking measures to integrate different development interventions such as agricultural extension, education, and health programs. In particular, health extension workers focus on PSNP beneficiaries and during PSNP-related meetings or while workers are taking a break from their PSNP work, they provide information on personal hygiene and sanitation, child and maternal health issues and health insurance. They also encourage PSNP beneficiaries to enrol. This approach is illustrated by a statement made by a key informant in the Tigray region, "Continuous education on health issues including about the recently introduced community-based health insurance scheme is provided to those people who are covered under PSNP. Moreover, during the distribution of PSNP payments, the participants are asked if they would like to register for CBHI" [Interviewed in December 2012].
More recently, in fieldwork conducted in May 2017 in SNNPR district, key informants at the woreda and the regional level argued that being a member of the CBHI delivers greater benefits for PSNP members since they are food insecure and they cannot afford to cover unexpected expenses of health shocks.
Not only are PSNP participants encouraged to enrol but local officials expect enrolment to translate into greater health care utilization, quicker recovery from their illnesses and influence the ability of the PSNP participants to provide labor. During a discussion on the CBHI scheme a key informant in Oromia region remarked, "We inform PSNP members to join the [CBHI] scheme because we want them to get immediate treatment when they get sick. If they are not treated immediately, it affects their performance in public works. These beneficiaries do development work and we don't want them to fall sick so the idea is if they buy insurance and get care then it may also improve their health outcomes" [Interviewed in October 2014].
At the village level, the same government officials are responsible for implementing both the PSNP and the CBHI and this clearly provides an incentive for officials to push both schemes. CBHI uptake is expected to encourage timely access to health care and might reduce illness-related losses in labor contributions, which are needed to build rural infrastructures through the PSNP. Timely access to health care implies that PSNP participants who are also CBHI members may be expected to provide more labor as compared to PSNP participants who did not enrol in the CBHI.
The potential links between the two programs are not restricted to officials and a FGD participant in Oromia remarked, Discussing her own situation, another individual in the discussion pointed out that, "I am the head of my household. Before I enrolled in the CBHI, I used to be absent from public works for days when either myself or my kids get sick. I used to run into arguments during payments justifying my long absence to the foreman. Going to the health center was not easy for my family. When they informed us about CBHI, I was the first one to enrol. Now, thanks to my membership, I don't get any more complaints for being absent as I immediately go to the health center when either I or my children get health problems and continue working on the public works. I now tell my non-CBHI neighbors to enrol in the scheme" [Discussed in September 2014].
Similarly, a FGD participant in SNNPR articulated the links between the two schemes and stated that the CBHI is a very useful intervention for food insecure households, "So far we used to get some money from PSNP in order to purchase food. Now we are getting health services almost for free after joining CBHI. What shall I say simply I would like to thank God." [Discussed in May 2017] .
Overall, the CBHI on its own is expected to increase health care utilization and to protect households from resorting to borrowing and asset sales. The PSNP is expected to lead to an increase in off-farm labor and through provision of payments in lieu of labor, it is expected to prevent food-insecure households from borrowing and selling assets to meet their consumption needs. Given the partially overlapping aims of the two interventions and the potential linkages between the PSNP and the CBHI we expect that those who participate in both the programmes will provide more off-farm labor, they should also be less likely to take up a loan and to sell assets in order to cope with shocks. 10 With regard to assets, in the empirical work we focus on livestock, as it is the most important asset for Ethiopian rural households.
Empirical approach
Based on the preceding discussion, the empirical analysis focuses on examining the joint effects of the two programs on health care use, off-farm labor supply, livestock assets and borrowing. 11 To identify the joint effects of the CBHI and PSNP we exploit individual-level panel data and estimate several variants of a difference-in-difference (DiD) model. That is,
where, , represents the outcome of interest for individual i residing in woreda j at time t, the interaction term ( * ) indicates participation in both the CBHI and the PSNP (both are binary variables), while and indicate participation in either of the two programs, is a vector of time-varying observables. 12 We include two sets of time effects, represents a time fixed effect, ( * ) is a woreda-specific time-effect, is an individual fixed effect and is a time-variant individual error term. 13 The main coefficient of interest is which indicates 10 While the channels through which the PSNP and CBHI are expected to influence borrowing and assets are selfevident, the expected effects of the CBHI on labor supply are perhaps not as straightforward. Our expectation buttressed by the qualitative interviews is that the CBHI increases timely use of health care use and consequently reduces the incidence or duration of illnesses and thereby increases labor supply. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficiently accurate information on the sickness history of individuals to demonstrate that access to health care has prevented illnesses or reduced illness durations.
the additional effect of participating in both the PSNP and the CBHI as compared to participating in only one of the two schemes.
14 While it is straightforward to estimate equation (1), there are a number of potential identification concerns that require discussion. As mentioned in section 2, participation in the PSNP is not voluntary and households cannot self-select themselves into the scheme. Beneficiaries are selected based on community identification of their food-insecure status as well as an assessment of their assets and employment status. While this does not preclude the possibility that unobserved factors such as local influence and social networks may influence beneficiary selection, unless such factors are changing over time it is perhaps reasonable to argue that equation (1), which controls for time-varying socio-economic characteristics and individual fixed-effects, is likely to be able to deal with endogeneity of PSNP participation.
A perhaps more challenging issue is the endogeneity of CBHI membership. As described in section 2, households choose whether to join the CBHI and it is possible that CBHI membership is driven by unobserved characteristics that are systematically associated with the outcomes, and thereby confound scheme effects. While equation (1) includes individual fixed effects and controls for time-varying socio-economic attributes, it is still possible that unobserved time-varying factors such as changes in health status, which influence the outcomes of interest, also drive CBHI uptake. 15 Keeping in mind the potential selection issues, prior to discussing estimates of equation (1), we explore differences between CBHI participants and non-participants
and also examine what drives scheme uptake.
14 The specification used here to identify the joint effect of the two programs differs from that used in Pace et al. (2017) . In their specification, the sample is divided into four mutually exclusive groups and their variable indicating joint participation takes on a value 1 and 0 otherwise and is not an interaction term. In our case, we use an interaction term. Regardless of the specification used, the results are not different. 15 As a robustness check, we also estimate specifications that include three time-varying measures of health status and experience of any type of shock (health, natural, economic, social, institutional, market or other) in the twelve months preceding the survey.
Results
PSNP and CBHI -Uptake
In 2011, before the launch of the CBHI, about 21 percent of the sample respondents were enrolled in the PSNP. The figure increased slightly in 2012 (22 percent) but fell to 18 percent in 2013 (see Table 1 ). While the aggregate PSNP enrolment figures do not exhibit much variation over time, this is misleading, as over the three years it is not the same individuals who remain in the scheme.
Some individuals graduate from the scheme while others join the scheme. With regard to the CBHI, within a year of its launch, CBHI enrolment reached 43 percent and in 2013, rose to 51 percent (Table 1) . PSNP beneficiaries are far more likely to participate in the CBHI scheme. For instance, in 2012 about 65 percent of PSNP beneficiaries enrolled in the scheme as compared to an enrolment rate of 38 percent amongst non-beneficiaries while in 2013 the corresponding figures were 72 and 46 percent (Table 2) . By 2013, 52 percent of sample was not enrolled in either of the two schemes, 30 percent were enrolled only in the CBHI, 9 percent in both schemes and 8 percent only in the PSNP (Table 3) . that individuals with poorer health status -either self-assessed or based on the incidence of recent illness or the prevalence of chronic conditions are more likely to join the CBHI or both schemes.
Who enrols in the PSNP and the CBHI?
Multinomial logit estimates of the probability of being in the four categories (Table 5) yields the same message. Individuals in the highest consumption quintile are about 6 percentage points less likely to belong to both programs and 9 percentage points more likely to enrol in the CBHI. Similarly, households with larger land endowments are 4 percentage points less likely to belong to both programs and 6 percentage points more likely to enrol in the CBHI. With regard to health status, past illness has no bearing on program status, the incidence of chronic illness reduces the probability of being in both programs by 3 percentage points and has no bearing on determining entry into the CBHI. If anything those with better self-assessed health status are more likely to join both programs and self-assessed health status does not influence insurance uptake.
With regard to the outcomes, at baseline, consistent with the consumption data, those who participate in both programs have substantially lower livestock holdings and are far more likely to be engaged in off-farm work (see Table 4 ). At baseline, their utilization of health care is also lower as compared to those who do not belong to both programs or those who eventually participate only in the CBHI.
The clear picture emerging from this section is that selection into the four different groups is strongly linked to socio-economic status and not to health status. The empirical estimates presented in the next section do control for a range of time-varying attributes, including socioeconomic status and for individual fixed-effects. Furthermore, the substantially lower socioeconomic status and lower health care use, at baseline, for those who belong to both programs, suggests negative selection into this category and supports the idea that, if at all, estimates of the effect of belonging to both social programs are likely to be downward biased.
The joint effect of CBHI and PSNP
Estimates of the joint and individual effect of the two programs on health care utilization, labor supply, livestock and borrowings are presented in Table 7 . 17 We begin with a discussion of the effect of the two schemes on health care utilization. Participating in the CBHI increases the probability of using outpatient health care by 2.3 percentage points or 26 percent compared to those who don't participate in either program. In contrast, PSNP membership on its own does not have a statistically significant effect on health care use. However, the additional effect of belonging to both programs is a 4.6 percentage point increase in the use of health care for those who belong to both programs as compared to those who belong to one of the two programs. Joint membership also has a positive effect on the frequency of using modern health care, although the effect is not precise. While the estimates in Table 7 focus only on adults, we also estimated the effect of participation in the two schemes on other household members, that is, young children (less than 15) and older adults (65 and above) and for the full sample (see Table A5 ). These estimates confirm the finding that joint membership increases both the probability of using health care and the frequency of use. Thus, not only does participating in the PSNP translate into greater enrolment in the CBHI (see Table 2 ) it also translates into greater use of health care amongst those belonging to both programs.
As discussed in Section 4, government officials use the PSNP as a platform to encourage greater uptake of CBHI not only to fulfil enrolment targets but also to mitigate the effect of healthrelated reasons for not providing PSNP labor contributions. If this is valid then participation in both programs may be expected to translate not only into greater health care use but also into greater off-farm labor supply. As shown in Table 7 , participating in the PSNP increases the probability of providing off-farm work by 13 percentage points. Given the nature of the PSNP, which requires off-farm work in order to obtain benefits this may be expected. In contrast, on its own CBHI membership has no effect on labor supply. However, the additional effect of 17 The detailed estimates are provided in Tables A3 and A4. participating in both programs as compared to one of the two is positive and statistically significant (7 percentage points).
The large, positive and statistically significant effect of joint membership is also evident in terms of hours of off-farm labor supply. An individual participating only in the PSNP provides an additional 6 hours of work as compared to those who do not participate in any program while individuals belonging to both programs provide 11 more hours per month to off-farm activities as compared to those who participate only in one of the two programs. The increase in health care use and the increase in off-farm labor supply is consistent with the claim of government officials and the view of participants who are members of both programs (see Section 4) that the CBHI helps individuals access health care in a timely manner and may reduce health-related absenteeism in public work activities of the PSNP.
On their own, the two social programs do not have an impact on the value of livestock assets (see Table 7 ). This is consistent with the findings on the effect of the CBHI on livestock assets as reported in Yilma et al. (2015) and also the effect of the PSNP on livestock assets as reported in Andersson et al. (2011) . 18 In contrast, belonging to both programs is associated with a 717 Birr increase in the value of livestock or a modest increase of about 4 percent as compared to those who don't belong to either program.
With regard to the incidence of borrowing, the effect emanates almost entirely from CBHI membership. PSNP on its own does not influence the probability of borrowing and the joint effect is zero. In contrast, conditional on borrowing, while CBHI membership encourages greater borrowing, membership of both programs works towards reducing the debt burden of households.
Belonging to both programs is associated with a 616 Birr or 28 percent reduction in debt.
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18 In contrast to the finding reported in Andersson et al. (2011) , Berhane et al. (2011) find that five years of participation in the public works programs raises livestock holdings by 0.38 tropical livestock units (TLU) relative to those who have participated for only one year. The effect is statistically significant. 19 We also estimated household level regressions of livestock and borrowing (see Table A9 ). The effect of joint membership on livestock is positive but statistically insignificant while the effect on the amount of borrowing remains in the same range as reported earlier.
Overall, for almost all the outcomes, the interaction term is statistically significant and large implying that the joint effect of the two programmes is larger than the sum of the individual effects.
These estimates suggest that the PSNP and the CBHI may be used as complementary instruments for enhancing health care utilization, off-farm labor supply, protecting household assets and reducing indebtedness.
Robustness checks
As has been shown in Table 4 , at baseline, there are clear differences in the socio-economic status of those who are enrolled in both schemes versus those who are not enrolled in either scheme or enrolled only in the CBHI. While our estimates do control for individual fixed-effects and timevarying traits, it is still possible that pre-existing unobservable differences at baseline may influence the trajectory of the outcome variables in subsequent years and contaminate the effects of the CBHI and the PSNP. This section reports on three robustness checks carried out to probe the sensitivity of the estimates.
First, we restricted the sample only to those who participate in the PSNP. As shown in Table 4 , at baseline, those who participate only in the PSNP have similar characteristics as compared to those who participate in both programs. 20 While not as crisp as those reported in Table 7 , estimates conditioning on PSNP status (see Table A6 ) reveal a similar pattern. That is, PSNP participants who are enrolled in the CBHI are 4 percentage points more likely to use health care and 10 percentage points more likely to engage in off-farm labor. Their labor contribution in terms of hours of work is 31% higher than their non-CBHI enrolled counterparts. While there is no effect on livestock assets, their participation in the CBHI is associated with an 18% reduction in borrowing. 20 A joint test for differences in means of the six outcome variables (excluding loan amount as the number of observations differs) yields a p-value of 0.374. Individually, none of the outcome variables are statistically different at least at the 5% level.
Second, we estimated the probability of enrolling in the CBHI as a function of characteristics at baseline and obtained estimates of the probability of enrolling in the program.
Subsequently, we restricted the PSNP sub-sample to observations on common support and estimated a propensity-score weighted specification of equation (1). As shown in Table A7 , estimates based on the reweighted sub-sample are very similar to those reported in Table A6 .
Finally, the CBHI scheme is meant to enhance access to health care only from public health centers and hospitals as opposed to publicly provided health posts (which provide free access) and privately run health centers. If we are picking up spurious effects then it is possible that joint participation in the CBHI and PSNP will also have an effect on health care utilization from health posts and from privately run clinics. Estimates provided in Table A8 show that this is not the case.
The effects we identify emanate entirely from an increase in health care utilization from publicly financed health services and specifically from publicly run health centers as opposed to health posts and private clinics.
Discussion and concluding remarks
In developing countries and in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, social protection schemes tend to operate in silos. However, the mutually reinforcing negative effects of the different types of risks, Notes: The p-value is for differences in means between columns 2 and 5 
Notes:
The first three rows provide estimates based on equation 1, while estimates in the last three rows show the effects of participating in both programs compared to a specific control group. Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, education, crop land ownership and experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial institution. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. Notes: Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, education, crop land ownership and experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial institution. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. Notes: Specifications include fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, household head education and crop land ownership), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size and composition), access to formal and informal financial institution. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at kebele level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01.
